Este artículo estudia la revisión que hace Antonio Pérez de la identidad intencional de Pedro Auréolo entre el ser aparente de una cosa como conocida y su ser real extramental. La teoría de la cognición de Pérez es claramente deudora de la teoría de la intencionalidad de Auréolo. Al igual que este, Pérez se apoya en el instrumento lógico de la connotación y en la identidad entre la especie inteligible y el acto de conocimiento. Pérez está de acuerdo con la (...) teoría de Auréolo, afirmando una identidad de indistinción entre el ser aparente de la cosa como conocida y el ser real de la cosa extramental. Sin embargo, Pérez parece no estar plenamente satisfecho con la teoría de la cognición de Auréolo, e introduce algunos cambios relevantes. En primer lugar, emplea la doctrina suareziana de que todo acto intencional, aunque apunta directamente a un objeto, reflexiona virtual o indirectamente sobre sí mismo. Como consecuencia, apoya una identidad entre el lado formal –es decir, el acto de cognición– y el lado objetivo –es decir, la cosa reconocida–. En segundo lugar, ofrece una definición de la identidad de indistinción que difiere de la de Auréolo. Al hacerlo, Pérez equipara el ser aparente con una forma universal, es decir, el acto de cognición como tal, caracterizando todo acto particular de cognición como propio de todo ser inteligente. Esta forma indeterminada, entonces, puede ser determinada por todo objeto posible. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende estudiar la crítica de Antonio Pérez a la teoría de la identidad intencional de Pedro Auréolo. La teoría de la cognición de Pérez es claramente deudora de la doctrina de la intencionalidad de Auréolo. El jesuita español utiliza a menudo las mismas expresiones lingüísticas que Auréolo (como "ser aparente") y coincide con él en la identidad intencional entre el conocedor -que coincide en acto con el acto de conocer- y el objeto conocido, que es lo mismo que (...) existe fuera del intelecto. Tanto Pérez como Auréolo basan su teoría de la identidad intencional en el De anima de Aristóteles, pero el jesuita español señala una incoherencia en la doctrina de Auréolo, que contradice la concisa afirmación de Aristóteles sobre la identidad entre el conocedor y lo conocido durante el acto de conocimiento. Al examinar a fondo la teoría de la identidad intencional de Auréolo, concebida como una especie de identidad de indistinción, Pérez señala una incoherencia entre la descripción que hace Auréolo del acto de cognición y su concepción de la identidad de indistinción. Además, Pérez parece considerar insuficiente la identidad de indistinción de Auréolo utilizada para describir la identidad intencional que caracteriza el acto de cognición. En consecuencia, ofrece una nueva definición de identidad indistinta para presentar el ser aparente como una realidad indeterminada que puede ser determinada por cualquier contenido inteligible. Esta revisión péreziana de la teoría del ser aparente de Auréolo, por un lado, puede verse como un caso de revisionismo escolástico temprano moderno aplicado a un pensador medieval y, por otro, encuentra una aplicación más amplia en la metafísica y la antropología filosófica de Pérez. (shrink)

Dopo un esame del contesto politico nel quale si colloca l'opera di Pietro, cioè le vicende che seguirono al conflitto tra Bonifacio VIII e Filippo il Bello, l'A. esamina il trattato De potestate papae valutando i temi principali che vi sono affrontati: i beni della Chiesa, il potere papale, il rapporto fra potere spirituale e temporale ed il rapporto del papato con il regno di Francia e l'Impero. Le fonti che maggiormente orientano il trattato sono le Bolle di Bonifacio (...) VIII Unam Sanctam e Ausculta, fili e il De ecclesiastica potestate di Egidio Romano. La posizione di Pietro non è completamente conforme all'ideale teocratico: essa si avvicina piuttosto, sottolinea l'A., al pensiero di Giovanni da Parigi nel tentativo di mitigare le istanze teocratiche e riconoscere una certa autonomia al potere temporale. (shrink)

Léon Brunschvicg's contribution to philosophical thought in fin-de-siècle France receives full explication in the first English-language study on his work. Arguing that Brunschvicg is crucial to understanding the philosophical schools which took root in 20th-century France, Pietro Terzi locates Brunschvicg alongside his contemporary Henri Bergson, as well as the range of thinkers he taught and influenced, including Lévinas, Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir, and Sartre. Brunschvicg's deep engagement with debates concerning spiritualism and rationalism, neo-Kantian philosophy, and the role of mathematics in (...) philosophy made him the perfect supervisor for a whole host of nascent philosophical ideas which were forming in the work of his students. Terzi outlines Brunchvicg's defence of neo-Kantian judgement, historical analysis and the inextricability of the natural and humanist sciences to any rigorous system of philosophy, with wide-ranging implications for contemporary scholarship. (shrink)

The chapter explores comparatively the attention to the practical dimension that—each in his own way—Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the classic pragmatist thinker William James pay when confronted with the challenge of providing a non-skeptical response to the relativist stance on truth that arose in the post-Kantian age. Particular focus will be given to the extent to which these three authors conceived of the practical framework as the only one that allows us to meaningfully address and determine truth.

Describing and defining what 'Japan style' is, this book explores specific achievements in Japanese art and architecture, offering an analysis of the Japanese culture, its vision of the world and of humankind.

We discuss the role of perceptron (or threshold) connectives in the context of Description Logic, and in particular their possible use as a bridge between statistical learning of models from data and logical reasoning over knowledge bases. We prove that such connectives can be added to the language of most forms of Description Logic without increasing the complexity of the corresponding inference problem. We show, with a practical example over the Gene Ontology, how even simple instances of perceptron connectives are (...) expressive enough to represent learned, complex concepts derived from real use cases. This opens up the possibility to import concepts learnt from data into existing ontologies. (shrink)

We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like “rationality at a node” and “knowledge at a node.” We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own “theory of the game.” The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general the (...) game theorist's theory of the game is not and need not be axiomatized, the players' theory must be an axiomatic one, since we model players as analogous to automatic theorem provers that play the game by inferring (or computing) a sequence of moves. We provide the players with an axiomatic theory sufficient to infer a solution for the game (in our case, the backwards induction equilibrium), and prove its consistency. We then inquire what happens when the theory of the game is augmented with information that a move outside the inferred solution has occurred. We show that a theory that is sufficient for the players to infer a solution and still remains consistent in the face of deviations must be modular. By this we mean that players have distributed knowledge of it. Finally, we show that whenever the theory of the game is group-knowledge (or common knowledge) among the players (i.e., it is the same at each node), a deviation from the solution gives rise to inconsistencies and therefore forces a revision of the theory at later nodes. On the contrary, whenever a theory of the game is modular, a deviation from equilibrium play does not induce a revision of the theory. (shrink)

(English:) This contribution attempts a first non-normative approach to the problem of the classic, its definition and its meaning in an age of globalization. It reviews a series of common representations of the classic (and other analogous or contrary terms), stressing the programmatic-ideological aspect that generally characterizes them. Classic, actually, tends to be a foundational category, and therefore rests on delimitations that determine its exclusiveness as opposed to something else. This paper, in particular, criticizes the last boundary of the exclusivity (...) of the classic, that is, its normative opposition to fashion and actuality. On the contrary, it is argued that there is a substantial link between classic, actuality and fashion. On the basis of this connection, two deflationary definitions of the classic are proposed: the first regards it as part of the broader process of construction of historical identity by concrete individuals. The second, on the other hand, conceives it as a product of art, and, therefore, of a formative process of abilities, skills, taste, by which the classic becomes the object of technical, aesthetic and teleological judgments. -/- (Spanish:) En esta contribución se intenta una primera aproximación no normativa al problema del clásico, su definición y su significado en una era de globalización. Se revisa una serie de representaciones comunes sobre lo clásico (y otros términos análogos o contrarios), se destaca el aspecto programático-ideológico que por lo general las caracteriza. Clásico, en efecto, tiende a ser una categoría fundacional, por lo cual se apoya en delimitaciones que determinan su exclusividad por oposición a otra cosa. En este trabajo, en particular, se critica la última frontera de la exclusividad de lo clásico, es decir, su oposición normativa a la moda y la actualidad. Por el contrario, se argumenta que existe un vínculo sustancial entre el clásico, la actualidad y la moda. A partir de esta conexión, se proponen dos definiciones deflacionarias del clásico: la primera lo considera parte del proceso más amplio de construcción de la identidad histórica por parte de individuos concretos. El segundo, en cambio, lo concibe como un producto del arte, y, por tanto, de un proceso de formación de competencias, habilidades, gusto, por el cual el clásico se convierte en objeto de juicios técnicos, estéticos y teleológicos. (shrink)

Tomo I. Religione ed eterodossia, Normatiavità e non conformismo: Dallo gnosticismo al Romanticismo nelle prime tre edizioni -- Tomo II. Appendice alla IV edizione -- Appendice alla V edizone -- Dopo e a lato, Rassegna bibliografica ragionata sulle origini dell'Islam e la loro importanza nel determinarne i succesivi sviluppi -- Marginalia.

In this paper we apply the idea of Revision Rules, originally developed within the framework of the theory of truth and later extended to a general mode of definition, to the analysis of the arithmetical hierarchy. This is also intended as an example of how ideas and tools from philosophical logic can provide a different perspective on mathematically more “respectable” entities. Revision Rules were first introduced by A. Gupta and N. Belnap as tools in the theory of truth, and they (...) have been further developed to provide the foundations for a general theory of (possibly circular) definitions. Revision Rules are non-monotonic inductive operators that are iterated into the transfinite beginning with some given “bootstrapper” or “initial guess.” Since their iteration need not give rise to an increasing sequence, Revision Rules require a particular kind of operation of “passage to the limit,” which is a variation on the idea of the inferior limit of a sequence. We then define a sequence of sets of strictly increasing arithmetical complexity, and provide a representation of these sets by means of an operator G(x, φ) whose “revision” is carried out over ω2 beginning with any total function satisfying certain relatively simple conditions. Even this relatively simple constraint is later lifted, in a theorem whose proof is due to Anil Gupta. (shrink)

This volume provides a geographically and historically diverse overview of philosophical traditions that establish a deep connection between truth and practice, or even see truth itself as a kind of practice. Under the label "practices of truth" are subsumed disparate approaches that can be fruitfully brought together to explore the intersections between truth and practice in philosophy as well as to address a range of intriguing questions about truth that fall outside the domain of pure theory. The chapters in this (...) volume provide a variety of perspectives on key practices of truth in philosophy and in the history of philosophy, enriching our understanding of the different ways in which truth and practice may be connected, including the role of certain practices in enabling philosophical insight into truth; the ways in which truth may actually be embedded in some practices; and the impact of truth on practice. Practices of Truth in Philosophy will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in the history of philosophy, comparative philosophy, ethics, epistemology, and the metaphysics of truth. (shrink)

The Handbook of Formal Argumentation is a community effort aimed at providing a comprehensive and up-to-date view of the state of the art and current trends in the lively research field of formal argumentation. The first volume of the Handbook is organised into five parts, containing nineteen chapters in all, each written by leading experts in the field. The first part provides a general and historical perspective on the field. The second part gives a comprehensive coverage of the argumentation formalisms (...) available in the literature at various levels of abstraction. The third part is devoted to cover some of the many dialogical aspects of argumentation, while the fourth one deals with algorithmic, computational and implementation issues. Finally, the fifth part provides some deeper analyses on the previously introduced topics. The Handbook of Formal Argumentation is an open-ended initiative of which the present volume is the first outcome. Further volumes are planned to cover topics not included in the present one and the initiative is conceived to grow by the support and feeding it receives from the community members. (shrink)

Orthodox decision theory is fanatical in the way it treats small probabilities of enormous value, if unbounded utility functions are allowed. Some have suggested a fix, Nicolausian discounting, according to which outcomes with small enough probabilities should be ignored when making decisions. However, there are lotteries involving only small-probability outcomes, none of which should intuitively be ignored. So the Nicolausian discounter needs a procedure for distinguishing the problematic cases of small-probability outcomes from the unproblematic ones. In this paper, I present (...) a dilemma for Nicolausian discounting: the view must be coupled either with a procedure that delivers fanatical verdicts of its own, as bad as those of orthodox decision theory, or with one that entails intransitive cyclic preferences. (shrink)

It has been observed that whereas painters and musicians are likely to be embarrassed by references to the beauty in their work, mathematicians instead like to engage in discussions of the beauty of mathematics. Professional artists are more likely to stress the technical rather than the aesthetic aspects of their work. Mathematicians, instead, are fond of passing judgment on the beauty of their favored pieces of mathematics. Even a cursory observation shows that the characteristics of mathematical beauty are at variance (...) with those of artistic beauty. For example, courses in art appreciation are fairly common; it is however unthinkable to find any mathematical beauty appreciation courses taught anywhere. The purpose of the present paper is to try to uncover the sense of the term beauty as it is currently used by mathematicians. (shrink)

In the paper it is argued that bridging the digital divide may cause a new ethical and social dilemma. Using Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons, we show that an improper opening and enlargement of the digital environment (Infosphere) is likely to produce a Tragedy of the Digital Commons (TDC). In the course of the analysis, we explain why Adar and Huberman's previous use of Hardin's Tragedy to interpret certain recent phenomena in the Infosphere (especially peer-to-peer communication) may not be entirely (...) satisfactory. We then seek to provide an improved version of the TDC that avoids the possible shortcomings of their model. Next, we analyse some problems encountered by the application of classical ethics in the resolution of the TDC. In the conclusion, we outline the kind of work that will be required to develop an ethical approach that may bridge the digital divide but avoid the TDC. (shrink)

An application of Narrative Knowledge Representation Language (NKRL) techniques on (declassified) ‘terrorism in Southern Philippines’ documents has been carried out in the context of the IST Parmenides project. This paper describes some aspects of this work: it is our belief, in fact, that the Knowledge Representation techniques and the Intelligent Information Retrieval tools used in this experiment can be of some interest also in an ‘Ontological Modelling of Legal Events and Legal Reasoning’ context.

Esse estudo apresenta os conceitos de documento e documentação propostos por Paul Otlet (1868-1944) presentes no âmbito da Revista do Serviço Público (RSP). Publicada desde 1937, a RSP contempla artigos nas áreas de Administração e Gestão pública, Políticas públicas e Economia do setor público, sendo considerada um importante veículo de informação no Brasil, contemporâneo ao período de efervescência do pensamento de Otlet. A pesquisa consiste numa Revisão Sistemática de Literatura (RSL) com análise documental da RSP no período entre 1951 e (...) 1975. Como procedimento de seleção dos artigos, utiliza o protocolo de pesquisa RSL elaborado por Valentim (2020). A partir do corpus de análise dos textos recuperados identifica os artigos que apresentam os conceitos de “documento” e “documentação” segundo Otlet, bem como os elementos constitutivos sobre o cenário da documentação no Brasil, na perspectiva da publicação de autores brasileiros na RSP, concluindo que os trabalhos analisados contemplam e ampliam a temática da Documentação com importantes reflexões de Otlet para a Ciência da Informação no Brasil. (shrink)